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Company Secretary: 
A Role of Breadth and Majesty  
©Prof. Andrew Kakabadse, Nadeem Khan and Prof. Nada Kakabadse 
Abstract 
 
Purpose: This paper presents the outcomes from 40 one-to-one semi-structured interviews and 
12 focus group sessions with Company Secretaries, Chairmen, CEOs, CFOs, SIDs and NEDs, 
about the role of the Company Secretary. 
Approach: Lukes’ (1974, 2005) third dimensional power is engaged in thematic analysis of 
this strategic leadership role and its contribution to Board effectiveness. 
Findings: The findings identify ‘discretionary capacity’ as being critical to effective role 
contribution. 
Limitations: Whilst the inquiry included international participants e.g. multi-national Board 
members and Company Secretaries, it was conducted within the U.K.   
Practical / social implications: Having a range of discretion is particularly necessary at this 
time, when the new governance regime is broadening its demands on the role of Company 
Secretary in order to interact with wider stakeholders. 
Originality: An emergent model of the Company Secretary role is offered as a tool for building 
discretionary capacity, based on key Technical, Commercial and Social characteristics, in their 
contexts - understood together as Breadth and Majesty. Breadth establishes a competency and 
Majesty the refined high-level social qualities. This study concludes that the Company 
Secretary role is highly dependent on the preferences of the Chairman, in enabling them to 
make an effective contribution to the Board.  
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Introduction 
Today’s organisations engage multiple diverse formats in operating across the more mature 
interconnected markets (Clarke, 2015, Knyght et al., 2011a), which are characterized by the 
competing pressures of integrated governmental policies1 and strategic business 
decentralisations2 (Chandler, 1962). Whilst the focus of institutional governance is on building 
risk-resilience capacities against volatile and chaotic market impacts (Kakabadse, 2015; 
Boussebaa et al., 2012), the firm leadership priority remains more towards How board should 
be structured and engaged to achieve better investor value (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Agrawal 
& Knoeber, 1996) from their committees and top-team members (Filatotchev & Dotsenko, 
                                                          
1 Regional and national governments e.g. UK renegotiation of relationship within the EU (2016). 
2 i.e. the firm behaving differently in each diverse local market.  
2015, Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2015; Krause et al., 2014). But the narrowly conceived (Kakabadse 
et al., 2013; Freeman et al., 2007) shorter-term institution-firm relationships reorientation has 
yet to effectively address the longer-term policy-strategy sustainability3 concern as supporting 
societal value (Bouglet et. al., 2016; Parker &Tamaschke, 2005; Griffin & Mahone, 1997). 
 
The wide impact of cyclical economic crisis (Shularick & Taylor, 2009; Schumpeter, 
1934) is not new to the advanced Anglo-Saxon market4. Examples include the post-Napoleonic 
depression (1812-1821), the Panic of 1857, the Long Depression (1873-96), the oil crisis of the 
1970s and Black Monday in 1987. However, the combined effects of exclusive government 
(Edelman Trust Barometer, 2016), low political engagement (Political Info, 2014), voluntary 
regulation (Elshandidy et al., 2015), potential distancing from the EU (UK referendum, 2016) 
and ever-creative neo-liberalisms (Kinderman, 2012; Heyes et al., 2012) all place the greater 
burden of this shared responsibility onto the shoulders of leadership in UK-based firms, i.e. 
firm strategy. An extensive global research of leadership teams/Boards demonstrates that 
“Boards within the U.K. are more often aware of the challenges, but do not adequately address 
them”(Kakabadse, 2014). Therefore, in this governance environment, the focus of attention has 
to be on improving Board effectiveness. 
 
 Organisational leadership studies have typically focused on the Chairman-CEO 
relationship (Kakabadse et al.,2006; 2010; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2008; McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999; Dalton & Daily, 1997). As a result of the 2007 financial crisis (Van Essen et 
al., 2013; Knyght et al., 2011b) the Non-Executive Director5 role in the UK attracted 
                                                          
3A greater equitable balance by leaderships between social, environmental and economic outcomes - more 
than just economic. 
4The UK ranks 1st in the Soft Power List - see http://softpower30.portland-communications.com/ranking  
orhttp://www.comres.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Report_Final-published.pdf. 
5 Similar to after the Hong-Kong Financial Crash - see Gul and Leung, 2004. 
considerable attention (McNulty et al., 2013; Kirkpartick, 2009). However, at the same time, 
the demands and pressures placed on the Company Secretary role have also evolved (McNulty 
& Stewart, 2015). Most recently, the Senior Managers Regime (SMR) that came into force in 
March 2016 gives more accountable responsibility to some independent NEDs and Chairmen, 
but the potential of unintended consequences, e.g. two-tier Boards; recruitment and retention 
of Board members; quantity and quality of information; and inequitable decision-making, will 
need to be mitigated in Company Secretary interactions with the Board (Durbin, 2016). Further, 
where no guidelines exist for stakeholders’ interactions with the Company Secretary, there is 
increasingly a need for a broader collaborative culture, e.g. with investor relations or internal 
audit, for strategic reporting (McIntosh, 2016). A long-standing criticism from within 
Secretariat being that Board members often have a poor perception and lack of awareness about 
this particular strategic leadership role - i.e. that of the Company Secretary (APPCGG, 2012). 
 
 Clearly, the current developmental need is for all top-team leadership members to have 
greater incisive discretionary professionalism and better team alignment (Kakabadse, 2015; 
Kakabadse & Van den Berghe, 2013, Kakabadse et al., 2009) for managing change (Tushman 
et al., 1986), whilst also meeting the evolving regulatory demand for transparent accountability 
(UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012;Financial Reporting Council, 2014) to their wider 
stakeholders (Solas, 2016; Beau, 2016). 
 
 Discretion gives the power or right to make official decisions using reason and 
judgment in choosing from acceptable alternatives. In Public Office, executive discretion is 
“the extent of legal flexibility to use government power by executive branch officials - power 
over personnel; budgets; information - giving coercive authority” (Cuellar, 2006, p.236) - 
where in reality “government actions are rarely purely discretionary, neither is discretion ever 
entirely absent...it is relative” (Cuellar, 2006, p. 37). In corporate circles, discretion centrally 
features in the debates concerning agency and stewardship issues6 (Berle & Means, 2009; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Donaldson & Davis,1991) and within Board accountability as 
governance and effectiveness (Hamza & Jarboui, 2016; Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2013). It 
also underpins the nature of individual leadership (Sheard et al., 2013) through periods of 
innovation (e.g. Apple) and crisis (e.g. Enron, Lehman’s, BP,RBS). 
 
 Therefore, this paper focuses attention on the critical strategic leadership role of 
Company Secretary (Swabey, 2014) and its contributions to Board effectiveness (EY, 2016), 
which has – to date – received limited attention. 
 
 The remainder of this paper proceeds with a brief historical overview of the Company 
Secretary role. This is followed by a precis of the typical day-to-day tasks associated with the 
role, which varies according to the size of the organization. The methodology section outlines 
the engagement of third dimensional power (Lukes, 1974; 2005) to analyse Company Secretary 
effectiveness; these are shared as ‘Breadth and Majesty’ findings. The latter sections of the 
paper offer a model of the Company Secretary role in building credibility in order to contribute 
to Board effectiveness. The conclusion asserts that the Company Secretary role is very much 
dependant on, and similar to, the Chairman role and is critical to the triumvirate relationship 
between NED–Company Secretary-CEO7. The most effective Company Secretaries are those 
who are able to exercise greater discretionary capacity in their role. 
 
Historical Overview 
                                                          
6Shareholder ownership and control at firm boundary. 
7 NED - Non Executive Director; Co Sec. - Company Secretary; CEO - Chief Executive Officer. 
The Company Secretary role has existed, in various forms, for over 5,000 years (see Table 1 
below). The concept, as we know it today, first appeared in English Case Law reports in 1841 
as a ‘secretary of the society’ and according to Hübner (1999, p. 461) the Company Secretary 
has been legally recognized since 1845. A point of note here is that the 1841 definition refers 
to ‘society’ whereas, in 1845, the role focus is on ‘Company’. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
In the English Levant Company, the Company Secretary’s duties held great power, including  
commanding actions to be performed in her Majesty’s name (Epstein, 1908, p. 74). Emerging 
from the East India Company, the role distinguished between ‘Secretary of State’ and a trading 
role (Kaye, 1853). In the post-World Wars era, i.e. 1950 onwards, the Company Secretary was 
increasingly recognised as an ‘Officer of the Company’ connected with administrative affairs, 
thus determining the “profession’s duties and responsibilities” (Monsted & Garside, 1991, p. 
4). More recently, governance development (e.g. Revised Cadbury Codes - Corporate 
Governance Code, 2012) has broadened the scope of the role.  
 
Role of Company Secretary  
Currently, statutory and regulative requirements shape the role of Company Secretary at the 
macro level (Companies Act, 2006). However, the spread of responsibility and activities are 
realistically influenced to a greater extent by internal firm procedures, such as company-
specific articles of association/ bylaws, company policies and practices, employment contracts, 
and organisational reporting structure and lines.  
 
 This regulation creates a framework for the scope of action that the Company Secretary 
has, and the articles of association/bylaws define each company’s unique expectations of the 
Company Secretary. Board structure and composition can be an influence on the role. US 
Boards may prefer duality and German Boards prefer two-tier (supervisory) structures, whereas 
UK Boards separate the leading roles (Chairman/CEO) at Board level (Dsouli et al., 2013; 
Spencer Stuart, 2011). Furthermore, the Company Secretary role (Directors Briefing, 2015) 
and tasks vary not only as a factor of the size of organisation (Table 2 below), but may also be 
influenced by the nature of the industry (e.g. energy, finance, tourism) or, more subtly, the 
background of the person in the role and/or the historical development of the role within the 
firm. 
 
    INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
 
In the largest companies, the Company Secretary role is based on the company’s statutory 
(formal) duties exemplified by the listed companies (FTSE 350) that are obliged to obey the 
statutory requirements (see Table 2 above). The Company Secretary may often also fulfil 
various additional functions/roles, such as being the ‘General Counsel’ and/or ‘Governance 
Officer’.    
 
 The range of the precise duties of the Company Secretary are less well-defined in 
statute, in comparison to other Board roles (McNulty & Stewart, 2015). This may emerge more 
as historical significance of how the company has grown from small to becoming larger in size 
(Table 1 above) and/or through the ability of the Company Secretary themselves to negotiate 
their terms or position as ‘Company Secretary’. These may  “usually need to be set out in 
his/her contract of employment” (Morris et al., 2009, p. 223).  
  Bourne (1998, p. 221) suggests that “a daunting list of duties and responsibilities awaits 
the person who is appointed to the position”. Thus, the boundaries of the role can vary 
considerably, as it embraces statutory, managerial, administration, and advisory/maintenance 
functions. 
 
 In the UK, the Company Code (CA 2006) renders the Company Secretary role 
mandatory for public companies (CA 2006, S271). Hence, the role of the Company Secretary 
is a statutory requirement for public companies, and is highly integrated into the company’s 
processes and procedures (Jackson, 2008; Knightley, 1931). Moreover, in publicly-listed 
companies, the Company Secretary “has important corporate governance responsibilities and 
are recognised by the Combined Code, which makes the appointment of and removal of a 
Company Secretary a matter for the board as a whole” (Hannigan, 2009, p. 123; CA 2006, 
S271). Hence, the Company Secretary must be listed in the Register of Secretaries (CA 2006, 
S275) and the Register of Commerce must be notified about any change (CA 2006, S276). The 
Company Secretary is “responsible for advising the board through the Chairman on all 
governance matters and for ensuring compliance with board procedures” (Hannigan, 2009, 
p.123, A.5.3). 
 
Methodology 
This study is informed by 40 one-to-one semi-structured qualitative interviews (Creswell& 
Miller, 2000) with Chairmen, CEOs, Non-Executive Directors, Company Secretaries and 
independent consultants. The focus of the interviews was to understand the Company Secretary 
role from the different Board perspectives - by the critical others8 and about themselves, as 
                                                          
8 Board members as directly linked primary stakeholder perspectives. 
self-perspectives9. Each interview lasted over an hour. The one-to-one interviews were 
complimented by a further twelve focus group sessions with 15-20 Company Secretaries in 
each session10 (see Table 3 below), purposefully selected in conjunction with the Institute of 
Company Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA). 
 
    INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
 In total, over 240 detailed contributions (Harre & Secord, 1972; Kakabadse & Louchart, 
2012) of individually-held beliefs, experiences and perceptions of the Company Secretary were 
conducted, audio-recorded with their pre-agreed permission, transcribed and thematically 
analyzed (see Table 4 below). Going beyond the role, this qualitative inquiry identifies the 
characteristic influences that establish a capacity for power within the Company Secretary role. 
The most appropriate guiding theory adopted is ‘third dimensional’ power (Lukes, 1974, p. 
2005). This overcomes the limitations of - Role theory (Mead, 1934) that simplifies activities 
of actors to their social roles;  Leadership or managerial discretionary theories (Finkelstein & 
Peteraf, 2007) that are constrained to economic/organisational perspectives and assumptions to 
their unit of analysis. Closer to reality, at the Board-level strategic decision-making is better 
holistically understood as a political process between individuals that, at the deeper level, 
emerges as a complex inter-play of power (Lukes, 2005).   
 
    INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
 
                                                          
9 Company Secretaries’ own views about themselves. 
10 In total, there were 205 participants in the focus group sessions in addition to the 40 one-to-one interviews. 
 Several themes emerged from the interview narratives (Corbin & Strauss, 1990) that 
could be classified into three characteristics. These may, in unique combinations, influence the 
Company Secretary’s level of contribution to Board effectiveness. Lukes’ (2005) third 
dimension of power establishes the ways in which the powerful transform the powerless in 
such a way that the latter behave as the former wish - without coercion or forcible constraint. 
Sometimes referred to as ‘ideological power’, this highlights the capacity of the Company 
Secretary in their ability to influence, or be influenced by, others. 
 
Breadth and Majesty Findings  
The interview and focus group transcription narratives were thematically analyzed and many 
traits of the Company Secretary emerged. These traits were then further iteratively classified 
into three major characteristics – Technical, Commercial and Social (see Table 5 below). 
Extracted from the interview data-sets, Table 5 shares the Company Secretary traits associated 
with each of the major characteristics. To exemplify, the trait of  understanding of Company 
law is classified as a Technical characteristic; business acumen in decision-making is classified 
as a Commercial characteristic; whilst traits of diplomacy and tact are Social characteristics 
(see Table 5 below). 
 
 For each Company Secretary in their unique role and specific context, the particular 
combination of these three characteristics establishes the third dimensional power (Lukes, 
2005) that the Company Secretary can exercise. Alternatively, it highlights where the Company 
Secretary is ‘dominated’ or ‘constrained’ in their capacity to make an effective contribution in 
their role and to the Board.  
 
 It is the combinations of Technical, Commercial, and Social characteristics, each 
ranging from formal (F) to informal (I), that enables the Company Secretary to exercise their 
discretionary power in a given situation, or consistently over time (Table 5 below). ‘Formal’ 
demonstrates low power (F), where the Company Secretary simply carries out instructions or 
duties, whilst ‘Informal’ demonstrates high power (I) - in which context the Company 
Secretary engages discretionary capacity as higher order skills toward contributing to 
successful strategic outcomes.  
 
 The findings suggest that Social characteristics are more evident or dominant within 
smaller organisations (Table 2). Within large organisations, this evolves to include a broader 
range of distributed power that incorporates a greater degree of the Commercial and Technical 
characteristics. Thus, for the high-performing Company Secretary in a large organisation, the 
dynamic ability to engage the broader range of characteristics, whilst retaining refined Social 
skills, becomes important.  
 
    INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
  
 The third dimensional power (Lukes, 2005) of the Company Secretary role then 
emerges as a ‘Breadth and Majesty’ capacity. Breadth establishes the competency (Technical 
and Commercial), whereas Majesty calls upon interpersonal, softer people skills e.g. calmness 
under pressure, diplomacy - as Statesman-like qualities in the approach to, and conduct of, 
tasks. The high-performing and/or effective Company Secretary will, over time, demonstrate a 
greater discretion (I) within the role.  
 
 
Contributions to Board Effectiveness 
These findings, with regard to the third dimensional power (Lukes, 2005) of the Company 
Secretary, are of particular interest as they explain how the Company Secretary can build their 
‘role’- engaging Social, Commercial and Technical characteristics -toward a greater degree of 
‘discretionary capacity’. At the same time, the interview responses can be understood in a new 
light - as Formal and Informal characteristics (or behaviours).  
 
 To exemplify, where the title in some cases was perceived as purely administrative by 
other Board members i.e.“The title is a misnomer...They don’t understand the role”[Co. Sec. 
01], or where the Company Secretary may not have been able to speak in the boardroom, “I 
don’t participate in the Board meeting”[Co. Sec.03]. These may refer to an understanding of 
the Role as formal (F), i.e. simply performing duty.  
 
 Contrastingly, in other cases, the Company Secretaries responses relate to Ban Ki-
moon’s important role as Secretary [Co. Sec. 05],or that they were able to comment in the 
boardroom [Co. Sec. 12]. These responses reflect differences in that these individuals 
demonstrate their informal (I) power engagement for exercising discretionary capability. 
Similarly, another example of exercising Company Secretary power (Lukes, 2005) is: 
 “Agenda setting is straight forward in that the executive directors know what 
 they want to say, but you also know what they don’t want to talk about and what 
 needs to be discussed….you can point the Chair and Board....” 
        [Co. Sec. Focus Group, 01] 
 
 Building discretionary capacity is dependent upon recognising what is important in the 
longer term, and requires being able to shift effectively between the broader holistic and more 
focused, detailed, demands. At the same time, the Company Secretary has to hold the trust of 
both the Board and the Executive: 
 “If you haven’t built up trust, you can’t play the role” [Co. Sec. Focus Group, 02] 
 
where, at the higher order: 
 
 “Judgment is sometimes exercised behind the scenes privately, helping to  
 steer things in the right direction”[Co. Sec. 03] 
 When discretionary capacity is exercised, the effective Company Secretary recognises 
that the nature of the role evolves, requiring a need for more independence, and at the same 
time, greater resilience: 
 
 “It can be the loneliest job in the organisation...to stand alone if need be and  
 do what you believe is right...” [Co. Sec. Focus Group, 01] 
 
 The Company Secretary’s daily interactions are with a group of self-assured people 
who all differ in their preferences, thinking and personalities (Chair; CEO; CFO; SID; NED) 
and their demands on this communicative role: 
 
 “You’ve got to be able to read people, understand where they are coming  
 from and speak their language.”[Co. Sec. Focus Group, 03] 
 
  
 However, the greater the level of discretion that is exercised, the more likely that 
Company Secretary has to constantly deal with dilemmas: 
 “I actually enjoy the moral ethical dilemmas, because I love trying to work  
 out what is the right thing to do”[Co. Sec. 03] 
  
 “It goes to the Chairman and the CEO, the CEO wants to change it and the Chairman 
 does not...”[Co. Sec. 02] 
 
 Where often the other Board member roles are more likely to be ‘charismatic’ or 
‘assertive/aggressive’, the Company Secretary may balance the Board in that: 
 
 “[The role] of Company Secretary is much more reflective and as I get older,  
 I’m more suited to it.”[Co. Sec. 03] 
 
 Actually, these days more often than not, the Company Secretary may be the longest-
serving individual in their role compared with Board members and thus have the advantage of 
corporate memory/history: 
 
 “...very good repository of cultural history as well as practical history...a 
 useful sounding board that helps shape policies and processes”[Chairman, 04] 
 
 
or it may be that: 
 
 “a new Chairman more than year ago, a new CEO last year and two thirds of the 
 Board are new.”[Co. Sec. 08] 
 
  
 These findings impact the level of contribution, ranging from low (Formal) to high 
(Informal) that a Company Secretary is able to make to Board effectiveness. This can be 
modelled to demonstrate the context-specific capacity of the role in contributing to Board 
effectiveness. 
 
Building Credibility with the Board  
In each particular context, the Company Secretary’s capacity can be understood to build 
credibility toward contributing to Board effectiveness. Figure 1 below presents a model of role 
contribution to Board effectiveness. The role can be understood simply as Formal (center 
circle) where the Company Secretary only demonstrates duty functions. This extends toward 
the outer circle (Informal) when a greater degree of discretion is demonstrated. These emerge 
as combinations of Technical, Commercial and Social characteristics within each context: 
 
    INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
  Thus, in each context, the Company Secretary demonstrates a unique (triangulated) 
combination of Technical, Commercial and Social capacity within their role, where each of 
these characteristics ranges between Formal and Informal (Figure 1 above). The larger the 
triangle is, the greater discretionary power the Company Secretary demonstrates. To exemplify, 
in Figure 1(A) low discretion is demonstrated, whereas in Figure 1(B) high discretion is 
demonstrated. Of course, there may be times or circumstances when a more Formal role 
contribution is needed; however this will be reflected as the triangular points closer to the centre 
circle. 
 
 This framework allows the Company Secretary to better understand their role and the 
perceptions of the role. More importantly, engaging the framework enables the identification 
of opportunities for building a greater level of discretionary power - through learning, 
experience and negotiation of the position of the role. For the individual in the role, it is worth 
appreciating that the nature of the role itself then advances from simplicity toward a greater 
complexity. As such, skills for dealing with ambiguity, the unknown, dilemmas and politics 
emerge as factors to leadership criteria. This framework, as an extended tool, allows for the 
perception of other Board members of the Company Secretary role to be better understood and 
questioned, to raise the understanding and profile of this role. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Company Secretary is the main contact for all Board members, who may be 
internationally based. Furthermore, the Company Secretary is most likely to be the first person 
to know the up to date developments, as they sit in committee meetings, Board meetings and 
have access to information that is critical to shaping the pre-meetings and agendas. Thus, the 
role is ideally positioned to exercise third dimensional power (Lukes, 2005) in their interactions 
with the Board.  
 
 The findings of the Company Secretary role emerge as a combination of Technical, 
Commercial and Social characteristics - where each of these within context, range from low 
(Formal) to high (Informal) levels of discretion (Table 5 above). The highly effective Company 
Secretary is able to exercise greater discretionary capacity in their role (Figure 1B above), 
which, in turn, contributes to Board effectiveness. The opportunities are for 1) the Company 
Secretary to build their capacity and 2) the perceptions of other Board members to better 
appreciate the strategic value of this leadership role, in order to engage with it most effectively 
(Kakabadse et al., 2014). In consideration, each organization, Board and context is unique and 
the role has to be aligned to the team (Board) within its specific context. 
 
 The findings of this qualitative inquiry have established a conceptual framework 
(Figure 1 above) for Role contribution to Board effectiveness. The findings suggest that the 
Company Secretary may often be the critical stability that maintains team alignment of the 
Board in a crisis or difficult situation. Often, the Chairman or CEO may become the focus of 
media attention or shareholder criticisms. Where their power capacity is constrained or 
pressurised, this dissipates to the other Board members (NEDs) to some extent, but more so to 
the Company Secretary. After all, the NEDs are likely to all meet together only at the Board 
meeting, and the Company Secretary is often more closer to the daily activities and ground 
realities of the business - with direct access to both CEO and Chairman. 
 
 This role is vital to successful team alignment and as such, requires stronger softer 
personal emotional strengths, i.e. Majestic qualities, as characteristics to drive the effectiveness 
of high-performing Boards. More likely, the success of dominant personalities (Chairman; 
CEO; SID; CFO; NEDs) is actually their dependency on the ‘power behind the throne’ - the 
Company Secretary. 
 Company Secretaries themselves often suggest that their role is very much dependent 
on the Chairman’s preferences. Our findings suggest that the Chairman is instrumental in the 
selection of the Company Secretary - in which case he/she may seek candidates that 
complement their style or particular needs, e.g. a legal or financial mind. The Chairman may 
also influence the level of discretionary capacity that Company Secretary is able to exercise 
within the role. In this respect, the inquiry concludes that the Chairman - Company Secretary 
relationship is unique and that a highly effective Company Secretary demonstrates many 
similar characteristics to that of the Chairman (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2007). 
 
 Considering Board effectiveness, different role interpretations reflect “boss, 
entrepreneurial and bureaucratic" qualities (Cutting & Kouzmin, 2000) to facilitate good 
decision-making, where power (Lukes, 2005) is distributed amongst the leadership roles. In 
reality, poor decision-making often reflects conditions where the CEO is boss. In contrast, the 
more effective alignment emerges where the CEO is entrepreneur; the NED is bureaucrat and 
the Chairman is boss (Cutting & Kouzmin, 2000).  
 
 Where the other leadership roles often demonstrate more second face of power (Lukes, 
1974; 2005)11i.e. using force in decision-making, the Company Secretary engages third 
dimensional power12 (Lukes, 2005), i.e. getting others to want the outcome you want, through 
co-opting them rather than coercing13them. In this regard, Board effectiveness emerges as a 
                                                          
11 At institutional level this maybe interpreted as Hard Power, e.g. see Nye, 2004 - as non-normative example.  
12 At institutional level maybe interpreted as Soft Power e.g. see Nye, 1990 - as non-normative example. 
13 Also evident at institutional level - see Dahl, 1961.  
balance between the second face and third level (Lukes, 2005) where the Company Secretary 
is strategically indispensable, giving attention to preference-setting and belief-shaping. Thus, 
this paper contributes as for the first time, Lukes’ third dimensional power theory (Lukes, 2005) 
has been used in the context of corporate governance to understand the role of Company 
Secretary and their discretionary capacity in this way. In addition, the paper adds to the 
discretionary, role, and leadership theories literatures at a deeper level. 
 
 Importantly, the role itself has evolved from being more an inward-focused role, to 
becoming much more outward-looking, where wider interactions with stakeholders such as 
investor relations, legal, strategic, media relations, and regulators in dealings of governance are 
an increasing part of the role. As such, the level of discretionary capacity of the role is critical 
to the contribution that can be made to business within society.  
  
To summarize, the Company Secretary is a unique strategic leadership role unlike any of the 
Board roles. Its value-adding capacity goes beyond economic perspective and monetary worth, 
to non-confrontational conflict resolving, in striving for consensus amongst the Board, 
ensuring good communication and in holding the best interests of the organisation above all 
else. At a time when the demands and pressures on the Company Secretary are increasing in a 
new governance regime, the question arises - for the Company Secretary to be most effective, 
should they be expected to hold additional functions? Through their Breadth and Majesty, the 
Company Secretary is able to exercise discretion and make an effective strategic contribution 
to the Board. 
 
 
Future Direction 
This paper has highlighted the Company Secretary as an important strategic leadership role 
with a key contribution to Board effectiveness. The findings assert that the Company Secretary 
engages third dimensional power (Lukes, 2005) in exercising higher levels of discretion, but 
that the capacity for discretion is highly dependent on the level of support and relationship with 
Chairman.  
 
 The model of the Company Secretary role as Breadth and Majesty is limited where its 
focus is on understanding this role’s contribution alone, as perceived by Company Secretaries 
and Board members. As such, there is scope for the emergent model to be extended or 
considered with application to the Board roles, i.e. what do the Chairman, CEO, SID, CFO, 
NED contribute to Board effectiveness? The outcomes of these findings together will then 
enable a broader understanding of how the different roles perceive each other. Further, the tool 
can be used as a mechanism for building longer term discretionary capacity within the role or 
as a flexible, context-specific analytical framework. If the framework is adopted across the 
board, then the inter-play of this collegial body maybe better understood. 
 
 With regard to broader contributions, the future direction should be toward improving 
both role and Board effectiveness; for better understanding the characteristics needed within 
crisis/stable contexts; or within particular industry settings. In doing so, the focus should be on 
building leadership qualities for the longer term, where both role and discretionary capacity 
bring benefit to business and society. The combinations of improved governance and 
discretionary capacities should afford longer-term Board tenures and a greater effectiveness in 
dealing with a fuller spectrum of issues over time, as opposed to being simply specialists or 
experts. 
 
 Ultimately, top teams need a better shared understanding of the bigger picture in their 
decision-making processes. In this regard, the future trend may be toward the Company 
Secretary role becoming more equitably engaged with at Board level, as it is critical to the 
successful strategic contributions of an effective Board. The shift may force the Company 
Secretary to exercise greater second dimensional rather than third dimensional power (Lukes, 
2005). Underpinning such potential developments depends on the nature of the governed 
marketplace and the preferred types of leadership that are promoted within it.  
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 Tables and Figures  
 
Table 1: Historical development of the Company Secretary’s role and duties 
Historical 
Period Role 
Development14 
Role Duties Author 
3000 BCE Analogies – e.g.  
‘writer’ (Ancient Egypt) 
 Registration 
 Administration 
 Organization  
Schlott (1989, pp. 90-
129) 
1550-1650 Consul and 
administrator 
of trade (e.g. East India 
Company; Levant)  
Govern (an ambassador 
or consul and the 
administration 
of trade) 
Gepken-Jager et al. 
(2005, p. 177) 
1750-1850 Servant (i.e. specialized 
tasks) – e.g. ‘secretary 
of the society’  
 Registration 
 Administration 
Collier (1972, p. 44); 
Monsted & Garside 
(1991, p. 4) 
Pontifex v Bigold, 
1841* 
1900-1950 An Officer of the 
Company (i.e. 
administration council) 
Determined by the 
bylaws 
 Registration 
 Administration and 
Management 
Werder (2008, p. 149) 
2000-2015 Officer of the Company 
and corporate 
governance officer 
Precise duties usually 
set out in contract of 
employment (not 
prescribed by statute) 
 Registration 
 Administration 
 Management 
 Procedures 
 Communication 
Morris (2009, p. 223) 
  Source: Designed by authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14The legal evolution of the Company Secretary before 1841 is not clearly traceable. 
  
Table 2: Typical tasks of a Company Secretary 
Large organisation 
Large Organization Small Organization 
• Organizing Board meetings and the AGM 
• Chairman/CEO/major shareholders/ 
stakeholder relations 
• Induction/training of, and point of contact 
For, Non-Executives 
• Keeping the Chairman up-to-date on 
governance/organization matters 
• Board evaluations (becoming involved in 
review/selection of third party choice) 
• Annual reporting – sections within 
the report 
• Statutory regulatory compliance; stock 
exchange listings; share transfers 
 
• Companies House filings 
• Change of details of directors 
• Statutory forms 
• Supply of company accounts 
• Filing of VAT/PAYE 
• Dealing with insurance/pension issues 
• Bank account mandate 
• Registers of members and charges 
• Custody of company seal 
• Company letterheads 
• Registered office 
 
 
Source: Kakabadse et al., 2014. 
 
 
Table 3: Study sample  
Study 
sample  
Chairman CEO NED Company Secretary 
 
Independent 
 
191M 
 
 
54F 
 
11M 
 
0F 
 
9M 
 
1F 
 
16M 
 
2F 
 
148M 
 
42F 
 
7M 
 
9F 
Key: M – male; F–female  
Source: Designed by authors with reference to study sample. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Analysis of transcripts 
Transcripts Themes Traits Characteristics 
 40 one-one 
interviews 
 12 focus group 
sessions 
 
Hundreds of themes 
emergent from the 
transcripts 
Themes collated into 
tens of traits - iterative 
process 
Traits classified into 
three emergent major 
characteristics as 
influences on role 
Designed by authors adopting Lukes’ (2005) understanding of power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 5: Third dimensional discretion of the Company Secretary 
 
Characteristic Company Secretary traits Breadth and 
Majesty 
 
 
 
 
Technical 
 
 
 
 
Understanding of Company law, 
governance codes, listing rules; financials; 
attention to detail; administrative and 
organizational skills; planning; analyzing; 
minute taking; record keeping; annual 
reporting; due diligence; looking after Board 
and committee; getting things right, doing 
them properly and getting things done. 
 
 
Discretion 
         I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        F 
 
 
         I 
 
 
 
 
 
         F 
 
 
         I 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
Role 
 
 
 
 
Commercial 
Minimum two years’ prior commercial 
experience in a different department; 
Business acumen in decision-making; 
budget control; problem-solving; flow of 
direct and relevant information; having  
justification; confidence in dealing with 
senior management or Board; managing 
complexity and bureaucracy; personal 
situational awareness and perspective; level 
of independence; self-assurance and 
integrity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social 
Emotional intelligence; communication 
skills; ‘Antenna’ of the bigger picture; being 
innovative; speaking the same language in 
the same way; intuition; relationship 
management; navigation; soft social skills; 
interpersonal skills; facilitating; influencing; 
persuasion; conflict resolution; discretion; 
diplomacy; tact; intuition; holding the line; 
knowing howto say ‘No’; choreographer; 
reflection; knowing individual personalities; 
patience; adaptability, enthusiasm; wanting 
to learn. 
 
        Designed by authors adopting Lukes (2005) to ICSA interview themes. 
                      Key - I: Informal (high level of discretion) F: Formal (low level of discretion).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Model of the Company Secretary Role for Board Effectiveness 
 
                              I 
 
 
 
       
   
 
                              (A)                                         
        (A)  Low discretion 
 
 
 
I      I  
 
 
 
 
 
I: Informal 
Source: Designed by authors      (B) High Discretion 
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